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Objectification theory (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997) ar-
gues that women in Western cultures are often sexually ob-
jectified in the media and interpersonal interactions as well 
as reduced to a body, or body parts, available for satisfying 
the sexual needs and desires of  other people (rather than a 
person with thoughts, feelings, desires, and needs; Bartky, 
1990). One manifestation of  this narrow focus on women’s 
body parts is that people recognize the bodies of  sexual-
ized women (vs. men) in piecemeal, analytic ways at a ba-
sic cognitive level (Bernard, Gervais, Allen, Campomizzi, 
& Klein, 2012; Gervais, Vescio, Maass, Förster, & Suitner, 
2012). The aim of  the present article is to identify two mod-
erating factors that may counteract the analytic processing 
and objectification of  sexualized female bodies— namely, re-
ducing the salience of  sexual body parts and enhancing tar-
gets’ humanization.
Objectification and Social Perception
Women are frequently sexually objectified in their daily 
lives (Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001). The objecti-
fying gaze, one manifestation of  sexual objectification, oc-
curs when a person’s body is visually inspected and reduced 
to its body parts, leading the objectified target to experience 
sinful feelings (Chen, Teng, & Zhang, 2013), to perform 
more poorly on cognitive tasks (Gay & Castano, 2010; Ger-
vais, Vescio, & Allen, 2011), and to narrow their presence 
during social interactions (Saguy, Quinn, Dovidio, & Pratto, 
2010). Moreover, sexual objectification is widespread in the 
visual media. For instance, content analyses of  print adver-
tisements document that women are portrayed as sex objects 
in approximately half  of  magazine advertisements (Lindner, 
2004; Stankiewicz & Roselli, 2008), especially in women’s 
fashion magazines (e.g., Glamour) and magazines aimed 
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Abstract
Recent studies have shown that sexualized female bodies are objectified at a cognitive level. Research using the body-inver-
sion recognition task, a robust indicator of configural (vs. analytic processing) within cognitive psychology, shows that for sex-
ualized female bodies, people recognize upright and inverted bodies similarly rather than recognizing upright bodies better 
than inverted bodies (i.e., an inversion effect). This finding suggests that sexualized female bodies, like objects, are recognized 
analytically (rather than configurally). Nonetheless, it remains unclear when and why sexualized female bodies are objecti-
fied at a basic cognitive level. Grounded in objectification theory, the present experiments examine moderating factors that 
may prompt more configural processing (i.e., produce an inversion effect) and less objectification of sexualized female bod-
ies. Replicating previous research, sexualized male bodies elicited more configural processing and less objectification com-
pared to sexualized female bodies. We then examined whether reducing the salience of sexual body parts (Experiments 2a 
and 2b) and adding humanizing information about the targets (Experiment 3) causes perceivers to recognize female bodies 
more configurally, reducing the cognitive objectification of women. Implications for sexual objectification theory and research, 
as well as the role of humanizing often-dehumanized sexy women, are discussed. 
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at men (e.g., Maxim; Baker, 2005; Stankiewicz & Roselli, 
2008). Given the prevalence of  objectifying images in the vi-
sual media (Reichert & Carpenter, 2004) as well as the unde-
sirable consequences on women’s mental health (Moradi & 
Huang, 2008) and on men’s attitudes and behaviors toward 
women (Lanis & Covell, 1995; Rudman & Borgida, 1995), 
this research area has attracted increasing interest.
Note that most of  the objectification studies we will re-
view show that the effects of  objectification mostly affect per-
ceptions of  female targets (for exceptions, see Gray, Knobe, 
Sheskin, Bloom, & Barrett, 2011; Loughnan et al., 2010). 
When viewing female sexualized bodies, for example, people 
evaluate targets as having less intelligence and fewer mental 
states, such as intentions (Gurung & Chrouser, 2007; Lough-
nan et al., 2010). These targets are further categorized as 
objects rather than as agents (Cikara, Eberhardt, & Fiske, 
2010), and people are more likely to associate sexually ob-
jectified female targets with animal, rather than human, con-
cepts (Vaes, Paladino, & Puvia, 2011). This dehumanized 
social perception may have detrimental consequences on at-
titudes and behaviors toward women, including sexual coer-
cion, assault, and violence (Gervais, DiLillo, & McChargue, 
2014; Rudman & Mescher, 2012) as well as victim-blaming 
(Loughnan, Pina, Vasquez, & Puvia, 2013).
In contrast to these studies documenting the dehumaniz-
ing effect of  objectification, a recent line of  research has fo-
cused on the cognitive underpinnings of  sexual objectifica-
tion. Consistent with objectification theory, which posits that 
women’s bodies are reduced to their body parts when sexu-
ally objectified, a recent study showed that people recognized 
sexualized female (vs. male) bodies in piecemeal ways at a 
basic cognitive level (Bernard et al., 2012; Gervais, Vescio, 
Maass, et al., 2012; Gervais, Bernard, Allen, & Klein, 2013; 
Heflick & Goldenberg, 2014). In the next section, we further 
explain differences between analytic (vs. configural) process-
ing and how analytic processing can be conceptualized as a 
cognitive manifestation of  sexual objectification.
Body Recognition and Sexual Objectification
Extensive research from cognitive psychology suggests 
that when perceivers view female and male bodies, they may 
rely on one of  two types of  processing: configural and an-
alytic (Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002). Configural 
processing is related to a global, holistic perception of  bod-
ies. Generally speaking, this refers to a type of  recognition 
that depends on perceiving spatial relations among the parts 
of  a stimulus. Configural processing is involved in person-
recognition (e.g., human face and human body-posture rec-
ognition). For instance, people can more accurately identify 
a previously seen part of  the face (e.g., a previously seen nose 
among two noses) when the part is presented in the context 
of  a whole face rather than in isolation (Seitz, 2002; Tanaka 
& Farah, 1993). Importantly, the same pattern of  results 
emerges for the recognition of  body postures (Seitz, 2002; 
see also Reed, Stone, Bozova, & Tanaka, 2003; Reed, Stone, 
Grubb, & McGoldrick, 2006). In contrast, analytic process-
ing is related to focusing on the local, piecemeal (rather than 
global) features of  the stimulus. This type of  processing does 
not require appraising spatial relations among the stimulus 
parts and is typically involved in object recognition (Reed et 
al., 2006; Seitz, 2002; Tanaka & Farah, 1993). For example, 
people can identify a previously seen part of  an object (e.g., 
a previously seen door) similarly when the part is presented 
within a whole object (e.g., a house) or in isolation (e.g., the 
door only; for reviews, see de Gelder et al., 2010; Maurer et 
al., 2002; Rossion & Gauthier, 2002). 
Importantly, the body-inversion paradigm has proven to 
be a robust indicator of  configural versus analytic processing 
(Reed et al., 2003, 2006; Yin, 1969). An inversion effect oc-
curs when recognition performance (e.g., identifying a cor-
rect stimulus among two stimuli after having seen one stimu-
lus) is poorer for inverted (upside down) stimuli than upright 
ones. The premise of  this paradigm is that inversion disrupts 
configural, but not analytic, processing. Inverted objects are 
recognized as well as upright objects because object recog-
nition requires people to focus on the isolated parts—not on 
spatial relationships among the parts. In contrast, inverted 
bodies and faces are recognized less well than upright ones 
because recognition of  human bodies and faces typically re-
quires people to focus not only on the parts but also on the 
relations among the parts (i.e., configural processing). As a 
result, we utilized this paradigm in the present set of  experi-
ments to examine when sexualized female bodies will be ob-
jectified at a cognitive level, that is, when they are literally re-
duced to their body parts and recognized in analytic, rather 
than configural, ways.
Integrating cognitive research on analytic and config-
ural processing with the premise offered by objectification 
theory (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997) that women are re-
duced to their sexual body parts when objectified, Bernard 
et al. (2012) asked men and women to complete the body 
inversion paradigm of  sexualized male and female bod-
ies. For each trial, a picture of  a sexualized male or fe-
male body was viewed and then two pictures were pre-
sented in a recognition task. One of  them was the picture 
first viewed, and the second was a distractor. During the 
recognition task, participants viewed pictures in either up-
right or inverted positions and identified the picture pre-
viously viewed. Bernard et al. found an inversion effect 
(i.e., better recognition for upright than inverted pictures) 
for male—but not for female—bodies. Their results suggest 
that analytic processing was triggered when perceiving sex-
ualized female bodies, whereas configural processing was 
triggered for sexualized male bodies (Bernard et al., 2012; 
see Kostic, 2013, for a direct replication of  Bernard et al.’s 
findings, as well as Gervais, Vescio, Maass, et al., 2012, for 
similar findings with a different paradigm). In other words, 
consistent with the premises of  objectification theory, sex-
ualized women were reduced to their body parts at a basic 
cognitive level and sexualized men were not.
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Despite these intriguing findings, it remains unclear why 
women were recognized analytically and if  there are factors 
that might moderate this effect. To be clear, analytic pro-
cessing of  women’s bodies (i.e., the absence of  a body-in-
version effect with upright and inverted bodies recognized 
similarly) is not completely interchangeable with objectifi-
cation. Indeed, factors such as the plausibility of  body po-
sitions (Reed et al., 2003) or holistic template information 
(Reed et al., 2006) have been shown to be important moder-
ators of  the inversion effect. Nonetheless, in the context of  
body recognition, the reduced amplitude or the absence of  
an inversion effect for sexualized women can be considered 
as a cognitive manifestation of  objectification—that is, what 
scholars have called ‘‘reduction to body parts’’ (Bartky, 1990; 
Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997; Langton, 2009).
Our article aims to explore what factors might be involved 
in the cognitive objectification of  sexualized women. Given 
that perceiving such images is associated with a focus on body 
parts (Gervais, Vescio, Maass, et al., 2012) and with dehu-
manized perceptions (Vaes et al., 2011), our article will exam-
ine how these two target features contribute to the cognitive 
objectification of  sexualized women in the perceivers’ mind.
Focusing on Body Parts. Based on objectification theory 
(Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997), one explanation for the an-
alytic processing and objectification of  sexualized female 
bodies is closely linked to a focus on women’s sexual body 
parts (see Bartky, 1990; Langton, 2009). In other words, if  
women’s sexual body parts are made less salient, then ob-
jectification should be tempered so that sexualized female 
bodies are perceived more configurally. Although not di-
rectly tested in previous research, this hypothesis is consis-
tent with several recent objectification studies. For example, 
mental state attribution depends on the visibility of  women’s 
body parts; fewer mental states were attributed to women 
when only bodies were shown than when women’s bodies 
and faces or their faces only were shown (Loughnan et al., 
2010). Similarly, eye-tracking technology reveals that people 
dwelled longer and fixated faster on the sexual body parts of  
women with hourglass-shaped figures (i.e., larger breasts and 
slimmer waists), particularly when they were focused on ap-
pearance (vs. personality; Gervais, Holland, & Dodd, 2013). 
Further, when analytic processing is interrupted by asking 
people to broaden their perspective using Navon-like tasks 
(e.g., seeing big letters [an L] composed of  small letters [h’s] 
and being instructed to focus on the big letters), people rec-
ognize women’s entire bodies better and sexual body parts 
worse (Gervais, Vescio, Maass, et al., 2012).
If  the objectification and analytic processing of  sexual-
ized female bodies is driven by a focus on sexual body parts, 
as we suggest, then interfering with people’s capacity to focus 
on women’s sexual body parts (i.e., masking them) should 
lead people to appraise them more configurally, producing 
the classic inversion effect. Because sexualized male bod-
ies are perceived configurally and not analytically, body-part 
salience should not affect the expected inversion effect for 
male bodies. Additionally, if  cognitive objectification and 
analytic processing of  female bodies is driven by a spe-
cific focus on sexual body parts, masking sexual body parts 
should lead to configural processing of  female bodies (i.e., 
the classic inversion effect), whereas such an effect should 
not emerge when masking non-sexual body parts. We exam-
ined these possibilities in Experiments 2a and 2b.
Dehumanized Perceptions. Another way to reduce the sa-
lience of  women’s sexual body parts in the minds of  per-
ceivers is to contextualize women’s appearance around hu-
manizing features that emphasize their internal mental states 
(e.g., intelligence and friendliness) rather than external phys-
ical features. Specifically,we hypothesize that providing in-
formation regarding sexualized female targets’ warmth and 
competence—two primary dimensions of  human judgment 
(Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Harris & Fiske, 2006)—
may suppress the analytic processing and the objectification 
of  sexualized female bodies. In other words, providing hu-
manizing information about sexualized women should shift 
attention from their external physical appearance character-
istics (such as sexual body parts) to their internal humaniz-
ing characteristics, thus prompting configural processing of  
women’s bodies.
Supporting evidence for our hypothesis comes from an 
alternative interpretation of  the appearance-focus litera-
ture within objectification research (Heflick & Goldenberg, 
2009; Heflick, Goldenberg, Cooper, & Puvia, 2011). Perceiv-
ers may humanize targets by focusing on warmth and com-
petence as another possible way to counteract objectifica-
tion, given that focusing on a woman’s appearance leads to 
less perceived warmth and competence than focusing on her 
personhood. In their work, Heflick and Goldenberg (2009) 
showed that when people were instructed to think about the 
personhood of  a woman, they attributed more competence, 
human-nature traits (i.e., distinguishing humans from ob-
jects: Loughnan & Haslam, 2007), and morality and warmth 
(Heflick et al., 2011) than when participants were instructed 
to focus on the woman’s physical appearance. Consistent 
with objectification theory (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997), 
personhood-focus (vs. appearance-focus) affected social per-
ception of  female, but not male, targets. Moreover, highlight-
ing women’s academic or physical competence is likely to 
decrease perceived objectification and to increase perceived 
capability (Johnson & Gurung, 2011). Additionally, per-
sonhood-focus (vs. appearance-focus) also causes people to 
dwell longer on faces and less on the sexual body parts of  
women (Gervais et al., 2013). Finally, although neuroim-
aging studies showed that targets perceived as lacking both 
warmth and competence are processed similarly to objects 
at a neural level (Harris & Fiske, 2006), providing individu-
ating information counteracted the dehumanization of  the 
often-dehumanized social targets such as homeless people 
and drug addicts (Harris & Fiske, 2007). We thus suggest 
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that humanization—providing information regarding targets’ 
internal characteristics including their warmth and compe-
tence— will draw attention away from women’s sexual body 
parts, which should cause people to process sexualized fe-
male bodies more configurally and to objectify them less. 
Complementing Experiments 2a and 2b, we directly tested 
this possibility in Experiment 3.
Overview and Hypotheses
Experiment 1 aimed to replicate Bernard et al. (2012) so 
that we expect to find less configural processing and more ob-
jectification of  sexualized female (vs. male) bodies. We then 
turned to two target features that may trigger more configural 
processing and less objectification of  sexualized female bod-
ies: focusing on sexual body parts and targets’ humanization. 
We expect that reducing the focus on (i.e., masking) sexual 
body parts (Experiments 2a and 2b) and providing humaniz-
ing information regarding sexualized female targets (Experi-
ment 3) will prompt configural processing and temper the ob-
jectification of  sexualized female bodies.
Importantly, previous investigations using the body in-
version paradigm have found consistent evidence of  config-
ural processing with better recognition performance for up-
right bodies compared to inverted bodies. In contrast, the 
same studies found mixed findings regarding reaction times 
(Reed et al., 2003, 2006; Yovel, Pelc,& Lubetsky, 2010). 
Consequently, we focused on recognition performance as 
an indicator of  analytic (vs. configural) processing and ob-
jectification. However, as a secondary purpose, we also sys-
tematically examined reaction times associated with the 
body-inversion task and investigated whether a speed-accu-
racy bias (due to target sex and/or induced by our experi-
mental manipulation) occurred.
Experiment 1: Body Inversion
Given that only a handful of  studies have shown that sex-
ualized female bodies are recognized analytically, with up-
right and inverted women recognized equally well by default 
(i.e., when no target or perceiver factors are introduced; Ber-
nard et al., 2012;Kostic, 2013),Experiment 1 aimed to repli-
cate these findings. Relying on the inversion effect as an in-
dicator of  analytic versus configural processing,we expected 
to replicate the interaction between target gender and up-
right versus inverted presentation observed in Bernard et al. 
(2012), with a stronger inversion effect (i.e., worse perfor-
mance for inverted compared to upright images) for male 
bodies than for female bodies.
Method
Participants
Twenty-one undergraduate students (10 women) were 
recruited on a university campus and participated in the 
experiment in exchange for €5. The sample was mostly Bel-
gian (86%). Previous research shows that the effect size was 
moderate for a within-subjects design; thus, a sample size of  
20 yielded enough power to detect significant effects
(Reed et al., 2003, 2006; Yovel et al., 2010). Consistent 
with prior research (Reed et al., 2003), we excluded outli-
ers based on overall recognition scores and overall reaction 
times in each experiment before we conducted any analyses. 
We relied on a priori absolute deviation around the median 
(MAD) analysis in order to detect potential outliers instead 
of  observing the ‘‘+3 standard deviations’’ rule. Indeed, the 
MAD analysis is the more robust analysis to detect outli-
ers, and this method is not influenced by either sample size 
or the value of  the mean (Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard, & Li-
cata, 2013). Note that we opted for a very conservative MAD 
threshold (i.e., + 3 MADs). Consequently, one woman was 
eliminated due to her abnormally low recognition scores (-3 
MADs below the median). Thus, the present statistical anal-
yses were conducted based on 20 participants (9 women).
Procedure and Materials
At the beginning of  the recognition task, participants read 
the same instructions as in Bernard et al. (2012):
We are going to show you a series of  female and male bod-
ies’ pictures. Next, you will see an image of  a person for a 
brief  moment. This person will be either presented in a ‘‘nor-
mal’’ position (upright) or in an inverted position (upside 
down). Then, two images will be presented. One of  these 
images will be the person that you first saw. The other im-
age will be a mirror image of  the same person. Then, you 
will have to indicate which picture you first saw by pressing 
key ‘‘K’’ (if  the correct image is the right one) or ‘‘D’’ (if  the 
correct image is the left one).
Pictures of  sexualized male and female bodies were ran-
domly presented in upright and inverted positions using the 
same procedure as Bernard et al. (2012) but with one excep-
tion. In Bernard et al., half  the male and female targets (12 
male and 12 female bodies) were presented upright and the 
other half  of  the stimuli were presented in an inverted posi-
tion (i.e., 48 trials). In the present work, participants saw all 
of  Bernard et al.’s pictures (see Supplement) in both upright 
and inverted positions (i.e., 96 trials). In this way, any ob-
served differences in recognition performance between up-
right versus inverted pictures could be solely attributed to in-
version per se rather than potential other differences between 
stimuli in the upright and inverted sets of  pictures. Recog-
nition performance (i.e., correctly identified images) and re-
action times (in milliseconds) were recorded for each stim-
ulus, leading to aggregated recognition performance scores 
and reaction times for all four picture categories (upright fe-
male bodies, inverted female bodies, upright male bodies, 
and inverted male bodies). Configural processing occurs 
when recognition scores are better for upright compared to 
inverted stimuli (i.e., classic inversion effect), whereas similar 
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recognition for upright compared to inverted stimuli repre-
sents analytic processing and more cognitive objectification.
Results
Recognition Performance
Recognition scores were submitted to a 2 (position: up-
right, inverted) × 2 (target sex: male, female) × 2 (partic-
ipants’ gender: men, women) mixed-model analysis of  
variance (ANOVA), with participants’ gender as the be-
tween-subjects factor. Consistent with our hypothesis, 
the predicted interaction between position and target sex 
emerged, F(1, 18) = 7.69, p = .01, ηp2 = .30, indicating more 
configural processing and less objectification of  sexualized 
male bodies compared to sexualized female bodies (see Table 
1(a)). Simple effect analysis revealed that upright male bod-
ies were recognized better compared to inverted male bodies, 
F(1, 18) = 28.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .62. Unexpectedly, we found 
a similar but less acute pattern for sexualized female bod-
ies, with upright female bodies better recognized compared 
to inverted female bodies, F(1, 18) = 6.47, p = .02, ηp2 = .27. 
The pattern of  results was the same when the outlier was in-
cluded (with a significant interaction between picture posi-
tion and target sex). Additionally, the mixed-model ANOVA 
revealed main effects of  position, F(1, 18) = 22.20, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .55, and target sex, F(1, 18) = 23.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .56. 
Participants recognized upright stimuli (M = .86, standard 
error [SE] = .02) better than inverted stimuli (M = .76, SE = 
.03), and they recognized female targets (M = .86, SE = .02) 
better compared to male targets (M = .77, SE = .03). The 
other effects (including those involving participants’ gender 
and its interactions with the other factors) did not approach 
statistical significance (all p’s > .22).
Reaction Time
Reaction times were submitted to a 2 (position: upright, 
inverted) × 2 (target sex: male, female) × 2 (participants’ gen-
der: men, women) mixed-model ANOVA, with participants’ 
gender as the between-subjects factor. We found a main ef-
fect of  position, F(1, 18) = 8.77, p < .01, ηp2 = .33, with lon-
ger reaction times for inverted (M = 1577, SE = 104) than 
for upright (M = 1402, SE = 79) stimuli. The other effects 
(including those involving participants’ gender and its inter-
actions with the other factors) did not reach statistical signif-
icance (all p’s > .17). Moreover, neither upright female (vs. 
upright male) bodies nor inverted female (vs. inverted male) 
bodies elicited longer reaction times (all p’s > .31), which is 
inconsistent with a speed-accuracy bias that would be spe-
cific to inverted female bodies.
Discussion
We found that a stronger inversion effect emerged for male 
body recognition than for female body recognition. This ef-
fect did not vary by participants’ gender. Consistent with 
predictions, this pattern suggests less configural processing 
and more objectification of  sexualized female bodies com-
pared to sexualized male bodies. Although the difference 
between upright and inverted female bodies was statisti-
cally smaller compared to the one observed for male bod-
ies, the inversion effect for sexualized female bodies was 
nonetheless significant. This finding indicates that people 
Table 1. Recognition Performance as a Function of Target Sex and Picture Position in Experiments 1–3.
  1 (Upright)  2 (Inverted)
Stimuli  M (SE)  M (SE)
(a) Experiment 1
 Upright (1) vs. inverted male bodies (2) . 84a (.02)  .70b (.03)
 Upright (1) vs. inverted female bodies (2) . 89a (.02)  .83b (.03)
(b) Experiment 2a
 Upright (1) vs. inverted male bodies (2)  .83a (.03)  .71b (.03)
 Upright (1) vs. inverted female bodies (2)  .91a (.02)  .82b (.04)
(c) Experiment 2b
 Upright (1) vs. inverted female bodies (2) with pixelated non-sexual body parts  .83a (.05)  .83a (.04)
 Upright (1) vs. inverted female bodies (2) with pixelated sexual body parts  .93a (.01)  .82b (.03)
(d) Experiment 3
 Upright (1) vs. inverted female bodies (2) in the neutral condition  .88a (.02)  .86a (.02)
 Upright (1) vs. inverted female bodies (2) in the humanization condition  .91a (.01)  .81b (.02)
(e) Experiments 1–3
 Upright (1) vs. inverted female bodies (2) in the objectifying conditions . 87a (.02)  .84a (.02)
 Upright (1) vs. inverted female bodies (2) in the non-objectifying conditions  .91a (.00)  .81b (.02)
SE = standard error. The column headings are defined by the parenthetical values in each row of the table. 
Means with different subscripts across a row are significantly different, p < .05.
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relied less on configural processing when recognizing sexu-
alized female (vs. male) targets rather than on pure analytic 
processing. Departing from Bernard et al. (2012), this find-
ing also suggests that sexualized women sometimes may be 
seen less as persons compared to men rather than as objects 
per se. As in Bernard, Gervais, Allen, and Klein (2013), we 
did not identify a speed-accuracy bias that would be spe-
cific to inverted female bodies. In sum, we provided a con-
ceptual replication of  Bernard et al. (2012) and found the 
expected interaction between target sex and upright (vs. 
inverted) position, with a larger inversion effect for male 
bodies than for female bodies that suggests more cognitive 
objectification of  sexualized female bodies compared to 
sexualized male bodies.
Experiment 2a: Focusing on Body Parts
As we have suggested, a plausible explanation for the re-
duced ‘‘human-like’’ configural recognition of  sexualized fe-
male bodies resides in the possibility that people focus more 
on women’s sexual body parts than men’s sexual body parts. 
This difference would undermine the configural processing 
that is necessary for the inversion effect to occur. Experi-
ment 2a directly examined this possibility by investigating 
whether masking women’s sexual body parts by pixelating 
them would increase configural processing, thus reducing 
objectification of  women’s bodies. If  this is the case, only a 
main effect of  upright versus inverted picture position should 




Nineteen undergraduate students (10 women) were re-
cruited on a university campus and participated in the ex-
periment in exchange for €5. The sample was mostly Belgian 
(95%). One man was removed from the final sample due to 
abnormally poor recognition scores (-3 MADs below the me-
dian). Thus, the statistical analyses were conducted based on 
18 participants (10 women).
Procedure and Materials
The procedure and materials were exactly the same as in 
Experiment 1, except that sexual body parts (i.e., the chest 
and the groin) were masked through ‘‘pixelation’’ (see Sup-
plement). Pixelation is a technique that is used in the media 
to avoid the visibility of  sexual content, reducing the explicit 
visual stimuli (such as nude sexual body parts) without dis-
membering the person. We pixelated chests and hips/ groins 
because they are secondary sex characteristics crucial for 
recognizing people based on their biological sex (Johnson, 
Lurye, & Tassinary, 2010; Johnson & Tassinary, 2005) and 
attention paid to those body parts has been considered an 
indicator of  self-objectification (Noll & Fredrickson, 1998) 
and other-objectification (Gervais, Vescio, Maass, et al., 
2012; Gervais et al., 2013).
Results
Recognition Performance
Recognition scores were submitted to a 2 (position: up-
right, inverted) × 2 (target sex: male, female) × 2 (partici-
pants’ gender: men, women) mixed-model ANOVA, with 
participants’ gender as the between-subjects factor. In sup-
port of  our prediction, only a main effect of  upright versus 
inverted position emerged, F(1, 16) = 10.42, p = .005, ηp2 = 
.39. Upright targets (M = .87, SE = .02) were recognized 
better than inverted ones (M = .76, SE = .03), and the inter-
action between target sex and position was not significant, 
F(1, 16) = .35, p = .56, ηp2 = .02 (see Table 1(b)). In contrast 
to Experiment 1’s findings, pixelating sexual body parts led 
to sexualized female bodies being recognized more config-
urally and similarly to sexualized male bodies. The pattern 
of  results was the same when the outlier was included, with 
a main effect of  picture position and no interaction between 
picture position and target sex.
The mixed-model ANOVA also revealed a main effect of  
target sex, F(1, 16) = 22.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .59, with better rec-
ognition for sexualized female bodies (M = .86, SE = .02) 
than for male ones (M = .77, SE = .02). Finally, the other 
effects and interactions were not significant (all p’s > .34).
Reaction Time
We performed a 2 (position: upright, inverted) × 2 (target 
sex: male, female) × 2 (participants’ gender: men, women) 
mixed-model ANOVA, with participants’ gender as the be-
tween-subjects factor. The effects of  picture position, F(1, 16) 
= 2.55, p = .13, ηp2 = .14, participants’ gender, F(1, 16) = 3.90, 
p = .07, ηp2 = .20, target gender, F(1, 16) = 3.36, p = .09, ηp2 = 
.17, and all interactions (all p’s > .12) did not reach statisti-
cal significance. Furthermore, neither upright female (vs. up-
right male) bodies, t(17) = -1.70, p = .11, nor inverted female 
(vs. inverted male) bodies, t(17) = –1.19, p = .25, elicited lon-
ger reaction times, which is inconsistent with a speed-accu-
racy bias that would be specific to inverted female bodies.
Discussion
Consistent with predictions, when sexual body parts were 
not salient (i.e., masked), only a main effect of  upright ver-
sus inverted position emerged; the interaction between posi-
tion and target sex was not significant. Contrary to Experi-
ment 1’s findings, this pattern suggests that sexualized female 
bodies were recognized more configurally and similarly to 
sexualized male bodies when sexual body parts were less sa-
lient due to masking. As in Experiment 1 and Bernard et al. 
(2013), we did not identify a speed-accuracy bias that would 
be specific to inverted female bodies.
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In line with recent findings suggesting that people focus 
their attention on female, but not male, body parts when 
recognizing bodies (Gervais, Vescio, Maass, et al., 2012), 
especially exaggerated sexual body parts (Gervais, Vescio, 
Maass, et al., 2012; Gervais et al., 2013; see also Gervais, 
Vescio, & Allen, 2012), our data suggest that making fe-
male sexual body parts less salient to perceivers activates 
more configural processing and less objectification of  sexu-
alized female bodies. However, it remains unclear whether 
this process is specific to sexual body parts, which were 
masked in Experiment 2a, or whether this effect would 
emerge if  nonsexual body parts were masked, suggesting 
a more general mechanism. We examined this possibility 
in Experiment 2b.
Experiment 2b: More on Body Parts
Experiment 2a’s results suggest that the salience of  sexu-
alized body parts is a key target feature driving the objecti-
fication of  sexualized female bodies. In addition, although 
the effect was driven by our experimental manipulation, it re-
mains unclear whether objectification manifested as the an-
alytic recognition of  sexualized female bodies is specifically 
due to a focus on sexual body parts or to a focus on body 
parts more generally. Study 2b was designed to examine 
these different possibilities. In this study, participants were 
asked to complete a female body-recognition task, viewing 
either sexualized female bodies whose sexual body parts (i.e., 
breast and hips/groins) or non-sexual body parts (i.e., arms) 
were pixelated. Extending Experiment 2a, we predicted that 
pixelating sexual body parts would make these features less 
salient, producing an inversion effect (i.e., upright women 
recognized better than inverted women) that indicates more 
configural processing and less objectification of  sexualized 
female bodies. However, we did not expect an inversion ef-
fect when non-sexual body parts were pixelated, suggesting 
more analytic processing and more objectification when sex-
ual body parts remained salient.
Method
Participants
Thirty-five undergraduate students (23 women) were 
recruited on a university campus and participated in the 
experiment in exchange for €5. The sample was mostly 
Belgian (71%). Three participants were eliminated. One 
woman was removed from the final sample due to abnor-
mally poor recognition scores (–3 MADs below the me-
dian). Another woman was eliminated due to her abnor-
mally long reactions times (+3.5 MADs above the median), 
and a man was excluded because he participated (and was 
thus extensively debriefed) in a similar experiment. Thus, 
the statistical analyses were conducted based on 32 partic-
ipants (21 women).
Procedure and Materials
The method was exactly the same as Experiment 2a but 
with two exceptions. First, participants saw only female bod-
ies. Second, we included a pixelation condition as a between-
subjects variable. In the sexual body parts condition (n=17), 
breasts and hips/groins were pixelated as in Experiment 2a. 
In the nonsexual body parts condition (n= 15), participants 
saw the same images of  female bodies, except that non-sex-




Recognition scores were submitted to a 2 (position: up-
right, inverted) × 2 (masking condition: sexual body parts, 
nonsexual body parts) × 2 (participants’ gender: men, 
women) mixed-model ANOVA, with masking condition 
and participants’ gender as between-subjects factors. The 
hypothesized interaction between masking condition and 
upright versus inverted position was marginally significant, 
F(1, 28) = 4.11, p = .052, ηp2 = .13 (see Table 1(c)). The in-
teraction did not reach conventional levels of  significance. 
However, because the interaction was hypothesized a pri-
ori (Cohen, 1994; Cumming, 2014; Kline, 2004; Rosnow & 
Rosenthal, 1989) and conventional levels of  significance tend 
to be underpowered to detect interactions (Cohen, 1988), we 
deconstructed it. We return to the issue of  marginal signifi-
cance in null hypothesis testing in the integration of  Studies 
1–3 and discussion sections.
Consistent with hypotheses, simple effect analyses re-
vealed that when sexual body parts were pixelated, upright 
female bodies were recognized better than their inverted 
counterparts, F(1, 15) = 13.48, p = .002, ηp2  = .47, indicat-
ing more configural processing and less objectification of  
sexualized female bodies (see Table 1(c)). In contrast, up-
right sexualized female bodies were recognized similarly to 
inverted sexualized female targets when non-sexual body 
parts were pixelated, F(1, 13) = .01, p = .92, ηp2 < .01, indi-
cating more analytic processing and more objectification 
of  sexualized female bodies when sexual body parts re-
mained salient. The pattern of  results was the same when 
the outliers were included. However, the interaction be-
tween picture position and masking condition was not sig-
nificant (p = .17). Additionally, there was a main effect of  
picture position, F(1, 28) = 4.80, p = .04, ηp2 = .15, with up-
right female bodies recognized better (M = .88, SE = .03) 
than inverted female bodies (M = .82, SE = .02). Finally, 
the other effects and interactions did not reach statistical 
significance (all p’s > .068).
Reaction Time
We conducted a 2 (position: upright, inverted) × 2 (mask-
ing condition: sexual body parts, non-sexual body parts) × 2 
(participants’ gender: men, women) mixed-model ANOVA 
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on reaction times, with masking condition and participants’ 
gender as between-subjects factors. The main effect of  po-
sition did not reach statistical significance, F(1, 28) = 2.79, 
p = .11, ηp2 = .09, and the other effects and interaction were 
not significant (all p’s > .19). Importantly, masking condi-
tion was not associated with increased reaction times for ei-
ther upright or inverted female bodies (all p’s > .41), which 
is inconsistent with a speed-accuracy bias that would be in-
duced by our experimental manipulation.
Discussion
In sum, consistent with our predictions, we found that 
only masking female sexual body parts produced an inver-
sion effect, with upright women recognized better than in-
verted women when sexual body parts were pixelated—a 
pattern indicating more configural processing and less ob-
jectification of  sexualized female bodies. In addition, we 
found that inverted and upright sexualized women were 
recognized similarly when non-sexual body parts were pix-
elated. These results show that sexualized women are less 
objectified at a cognitive level when their sexual body parts 
are pixelated and that they are more objectified when sexual 
body parts remain visible (i.e., when non-sexual body parts 
are masked).Additionally, as in the other experiments, re-
action times were inconsistent with a speed-accuracy bias. 
Consistent with Experiment 2a, Experiment 2b’s findings 
align with the notion that analytic processing of  sexualized 
female bodies and objectification is driven by a focus on sex-
ual body parts (Bartky, 1990; Gervais, Vescio, Maass, et al., 
2012; Langton, 2009).
Experiment 3: Humanization
Complementing Experiments 2a and 2b, Experiment 3 
examined humanization as a second target feature that in-
terferes with the salience of  sexual body parts, causing less 
objectification and more configural processing of  sexualized 
female bodies. Specifically, we aimed to examine whether 
providing humanizing information about a female targets’ 
internal attributes of  warmth and competence would reduce 
perceivers’ ability to objectify women (Heflick & Golden-
berg, 2009; Heflick et al., 2011). If  this is the case, then peo-
ple will rely on more configural processing and will objec-
tify sexualized women less when humanizing information 
about targets is provided.
Method
Participants
Fifty undergraduate students (27 women) were recruited 
on a university campus and participated in the experiment 
in exchange for €5. The sample was mostly Belgian (72%). 
Relying on a MAD analysis on overall reaction times and 
recognition scores, six participants were eliminated: three 
participants (2 men) due to abnormally poor recognition 
scores (–3 MADs below the median) and three participants 
(2 men) due to abnormally long reaction times (+3.5 MADs 
above the median). Thus, the statistical analyses were con-
ducted based on 44 participants (25 women).
Procedure and Materials
The method was the same as Experiment 1, with two ex-
ceptions. First, only female bodies were shown to the par-
ticipants. Second, we included humanization as a between 
subjects variable. Humanization was manipulated by provid-
ing information that highlighted targets’ warmth and com-
petence, which are dimensions related to personhood from 
previous research (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Harris & 
Fiske, 2006; Haslam, 2006; Heflick et al., 2011). In the neu-
tral condition (n = 21), participants read the same instruc-
tions as in all of  the previous experiments. In contrast, par-
ticipants in the humanization condition (n = 23) received the 
same instructions with additional information about the tar-
gets’ internal warmth and competence:
The pictures you will see are those of  women who re-
cently got their medical degree with honors. Deeply con-
cerned by the cancer issue, they decided to create a sexy 
calendar in order to raise funds destined to an association 
whose purpose is to finance caring for cancer patients. The 
money raised by this calendar is directly paid to this associ-
ation. Pictures you will see stem from this calendar.
Results
Recognition Performance
Recognition scores were submitted to a 2 (position: up-
right, inverted) × 2 (humanization: humanization, neu-
tral) × 2 (participants’ gender: men, women) mixed-model 
ANOVA with humanization and participants’ gender as be-
tween-subjects factors. In support of  our hypothesis, a sig-
nificant interaction between humanization and upright ver-
sus inverted position emerged, F(1, 40) = 5.79, p = .02, ηp2 = 
.13 (see Table 1(d)). Simple effects analyses revealed that in 
the humanization condition, upright sexualized female bod-
ies were recognized better than their inverted counterparts, 
F(1, 21) = 20.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .50, indicating more config-
ural processing and less objectification. However, in the neu-
tral condition, upright female bodies were recognized sim-
ilarly to inverted female bodies, F(1, 19) = .73, p = .40, ηp2 = 
.04, indicating more analytic processing and more objectifi-
cation. When the outliers were included, the interaction be-
tween picture position and humanization condition became 
not significant (p = .42).
Additionally, a main effect of  upright versus inverted po-
sition emerged, F(1, 40) = 13.57, p = .001, ηp2 = .25, with up-
right female bodies (M = .89, SE = .01) recognized better 
than inverted female bodies (M = .84, SE = .02). No main 
effects of  participants’ gender, F(1, 40) = 1.10, p = .30, or hu-
manization, F(1, 40) = .35, p = .56, on recognition emerged. 
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Moreover, all other interactions were not significant (all p’s 
> .10).
Reaction Time
Reaction times were submitted to a 2 (position: upright, 
inverted) × 2 (humanization: humanization, neutral) × 2 
(participants’ gender: men, women) mixed-model ANOVA, 
with humanization and participants’ gender as between-sub-
jects factors. A main effect of  picture position was revealed, 
F(1, 40) = 6.87, p = .01, ηp2 = .15, with longer reaction times 
for inverted (M = 1418, SE = 58) than upright (M = 1332, 
SE = 52) bodies. The other effects (including participants’ 
gender and its interactions with the other factors) did not 
reach statistical significance (all p’s > .09). In addition, the 
humanization condition was not associated with longer re-
action times for either upright or inverted female bodies (all 
p’s > .41), which is inconsistent with a speed-accuracy bias 
that would be induced by the humanization condition.
Discussion
As predicted, providing information about internal hu-
man characteristics shifted recognition processes mobilized 
by perceivers for women’s bodies. When sexualized female 
targets were humanized, people relied on configural pro-
cessing instead of  analytic processing, indicating less objec-
tification of  sexualized female bodies at a basic cognitive 
level. This is consistent with our interpretation of  the ap-
pearance-focus literature (Heflick & Goldenberg, 2009; He-
flick et al., 2011), suggesting that focusing on women as hu-
man beings with internal characteristics such as competence 
and warmth rather than as objects with only physical appear-
ance attributes counteracts the salience of  women’s sexual 
body parts, reducing objectification. In addition to masking 
the sexual body parts of  women in Experiments 2a and 2b, 
Experiment 3 identified a complementary moderator (i.e., 
humanization) capable of  producing the inversion effect for 
sexualized women that indicates more configural process-
ing and less objectification. Again, the pattern of  results re-
ported is inconsistent with a speed-accuracy bias that would 
be induced by our experimental manipulations. Collectively, 
this set of  experiments delineates two complementary mod-
erators—masking and humanization—that reduce the sex-
ual salience of  sexualized women in the minds of  perceivers. 
These target features point to factors aimed at reducing the 
analytic processing of  sexualized female bodies. Our find-
ings also are suggestive of  the sociocognitive underpinnings 
of  the sexual objectification of  women.
An Integration of Experiments 1–3
Across four experiments, we identified complementary 
target features that temper analytic processing and objectifi-
cation of  sexualized female bodies. Because we conducted 
several replications, we turn in this final section to a broader 
question of  whether objectifying conditions moderate the 
analytical processing of  sexualized female bodies. This ap-
proach is in line with recent calls in psychological science to 
examine the reliability and robustness of  findings through 
meta-analysis (across and within papers; Cumming, 2008; 
Giner-Sorolla, 2012). This was of  particular concern in the 
current article, due to marginal nature (p = .052) of  the hy-
pothesized interaction in Experiment 2b. Thus, in this sec-
tion, we integrate the experiments, comparing whether 
analytic processing of  female bodies is moderated by the 
objectifying conditions (i.e., female bodies revealing sex-
ual body parts in Experiment 1 and 2a, female bodies with 
pixelated non-sexual body parts in Experiment 2b because 
sexual body parts were still visible, and the neutral condi-
tion in Experiment 3 not emphasizing humanization) com-
pared to non-objectifying conditions (i.e., female bodies with 
pixelated sexual body parts in Experiment 2a and the hu-
manization condition in Experiment 3). This mirrors the 
meta-analytic approach that contains direct and conceptual 
replications and allows researchers to determine the robust-
ness of  an effect across investigations, despite differences in 
manipulations or participants that emerge between studies 
(Cumming, 2008; Giner-Sorolla, 2012). Overall, we expect 
objectifying conditions to cause more analytic processing 
of  female bodies compared to non-objectifying conditions.
Results
Recognition Performance
Recognition scores were submitted to a 2 (position: up-
right, inverted) × 2 (objectification: objectifying conditions, 
nonobjectifying conditions) × 2 (participants’ gender: men, 
women) mixed-model ANOVA, with objectifying conditions 
and participants’ gender as between-subjects factors. As ex-
pected, a significant interaction between picture position and 
objectification emerged, with more analytic processing of  fe-
male bodies in the objectifying compared to the nonobjecti-
fying conditions, F(1, 110) = 8.21, p = .005, ηp2 = .07 (see Ta-
ble 1(e)). Consistently, simple effects analyses revealed that 
upright bodies were recognized better than inverted bodies 
in the non-objectifying conditions, F(1, 56) = 37.42, p < .001, 
ηp
2= .40, suggesting more configural processing and less ob-
jectification of  women’s bodies. In contrast, analytic process-
ing and more objectification of  women’s bodies emerged in 
the objectifying conditions, with upright bodies recognized 
similarly to inverted bodies, F(1, 54) = 3.01, p = .09, ηp2=.05. 
Finally,we found amain effect of  upright versus inverted po-
sition, with upright bodies (M = .89, SE = .01) recognized 
better than inverted bodies (M = .83, SE = .01), F(1, 110) = 
29.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .21. The other main effects and inter-
actions were not significant (p’s > .13).
Reaction Time
Reaction times were submitted to a 2 (position: up-
right, inverted) × 2 (objectification: objectifying conditions, 
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non- objectifying conditions) × 2 (participants’ gender: men, 
women) mixed-model ANOVA, with objectification and par-
ticipants’ gender as between-subjects factors. We found a 
main effect of  position, F(1, 110) = 18.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .14, 
with longer reaction times for inverted (M = 1497, SE = 
44) than for upright stimuli (M = 1382, SE = 40). We also 
found a main effect of  participants’ gender, F(1, 110) = 5.58, 
p = .02, ηp2 = .05, with longer reaction times among women 
(M = 1535, SE = 53) than men (M = 1345, SE = 61). The 
other main effects and interactions were not significant (p’s 
> .16). In addition, the objectifying conditions were not as-
sociated with longer reaction times for either upright or in-
verted female bodies (all p’s > .18), which is inconsistent 
with a speed-accuracy bias that would be induced by the ob-
jectifying conditions.
Discussion
In sum, across four experiments, we found that analytic 
processing emerged in the objectifying conditions when 
women’s sexual body parts were salient. However, when 
participants were less able to focus on women’s sexual body 
parts—either because these features were masked or because 
humanizing information was provided—configural process-
ing of  women’s bodies emerged indicating that these factors 
temper the cognitive objectification of  women’s bodies. In 
the general discussion, we will turn to the theoretical and 
practical implications of  these findings as well as the limita-
tions and future directions of  this work.
General Discussion
The purpose of  the present work was to identify two tar-
get features that may temper the cognitive objectification of  
sexualized female bodies. For this purpose, we utilized the 
body inversion effect as an indicator of  configural (vs. ana-
lytic) processing (Maurer et al., 2002). Consistent with both 
theory (Bartky, 1990; Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997) and re-
search (Bernard et al., 2012), we found that sexualized fe-
male bodies were objectified more and recognized less con-
figurally compared to sexualized male targets (Experiment 
1). We thus examined two complementary moderating tar-
get features— masking sexual body parts (Experiments 2a 
and 2b) and humanization (Experiment 3)—that were pre-
dicted to lead to less cognitive objectification and more con-
figural recognition of  sexualized female bodies.
Consistent with our rationale that people process sexual-
ized female bodies analytically because they are focused on 
sexual body parts (Gervais, Vescio, Maass, et al., 2012; Ger-
vais et al., 2013), we found that the salience of  sexual body 
parts was a crucial determinant influencing the analytic pro-
cessing of  sexualized female bodies. People relied on config-
ural processing and did not objectify sexualized male bodies 
whether their sexual body parts were salient or not. In con-
trast, the salience of  sexual body parts shifted female body 
recognition from analytic processing to configural process-
ing (Experiment 2a), and this shift appeared to be due to the 
salience of  sexual body parts rather than any general body 
parts (Experiment 2b). These results are consistent with the 
notion that diminishing the salience of  women’s sexual body 
parts tempers their objectification at a basic cognitive level.
Likewise, Experiment 3 showed that introducing human-
izing information about the target was also associated with 
less objectification and more configural processing of  sex-
ualized women. We reasoned that introducing humanizing 
information should cause configural processing of  female 
bodies in line with research suggesting that humanization 
counteracts the negative impact of  objectification on social 
perception (Heflick & Goldenberg, 2009; Heflick et al., 2011; 
see also Harris & Fiske, 2007). By drawing attention away 
from sexy women’s external-appearance attributes to their 
internal-humanizing attributes, people relied more on con-
figural processing and less on analytic processing. In addi-
tion, the presence of  an inversion effect when women are de-
scribed as warm and competent undermines the perceptual 
account of  the sexualized body-inversion hypothesis (Tarr, 
2013) as well as bolsters the construct validity of  sexualized 
body-inversion as an indicator of  sexual objectification that 
can be combatted through sociocultural factors.
Finally, we integrated these experiments in a final section, 
comparing whether analytic processing of  female bodies is 
moderated by the objectifying conditions (i.e., female bodies 
revealing sexual body parts in Experiments 1 and 2a, female 
bodies with pixelated non-sexual body parts in Experiment 
2b because sexual body parts were still visible, and the neu-
tral condition in Experiment 3 not emphasizing humaniza-
tion) compared to non-objectifying conditions (i.e., female 
bodies with pixelated sexual body parts in Experiment 2a 
and the humanization condition in Experiment 3). This inte-
gration is in line with recent recommendations for assessing 
the reliability and robustness of  a given finding across studies 
(Cumming, 2008), particularly in situations with marginal ef-
fects (Giner-Sorolla, 2012). Consistent with the notion that 
target features modulating the salience of  sexual body parts 
may reduce the cognitive objectification of  sexualized fe-
males, we found that when sexual body parts salience was 
reduced—by pixelating sexual body parts or introducing hu-
manizing information—an inversion effect emerged for sex-
ualized women, indicating that these features reduced the 
cognitive objectification of  female bodies.
In addition, consistent with the notion that recognition 
scores, but not reaction times, are the most reliable indica-
tors of  analytic versus configural processing (Maurer et al., 
2002), we found that all our experimental manipulations sys-
tematically affected recognition performance as predicted. 
In contrast, exploratory analyses on reaction times revealed 
that body-inversion affected reaction times so that inverted 
bodies elicited slower reaction times than upright bodies, re-
gardless of  moderating factors such as experimental manip-
ulations or target sex. This is consistent with past research, 
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which found that variations in recognition performance do 
not necessarily co-vary with reaction times (Bernard et al., 
2012, 2013; Yovel et al., 2010). Importantly, all reaction time 
data are inconsistent with a speed-accuracy trade-off  (see 
Tarr, 2013) that would be specific to inverted female versus 
male bodies (Experiments 1 and 2a) or induced by experi-
mental manipulations (Experiments 2b and 3). As in Ber-
nard et al. (2013), this pattern speaks against the hypothe-
sis that observed variations in female body-inversion effects 
are driven by modulated attentional allocation in absolute 
or spatial terms. It instead supports an account of  our find-
ings in terms of  objectification theory.
Limitations and Future Directions
Although the present research extends our understanding 
of  objectification in important ways, it has some limitations. 
In Experiments 2a and 2b, we examined whether salience of  
sexual body parts affected body recognition. Taken together, 
our findings suggest that analytic, objectifying recognition of  
sexualized female bodies is caused by a specific focus on sex-
ual body parts, not by a focus on nonsexualized body parts. 
Our interpretation of  Experiments 2a and 2b was that re-
ducing the salience of  sexual body parts leads to less focus 
on them, causing more configural processing. Given that 
attention is a limited resource (Cowan, 2005; Miller, 1956), 
if  attention is not going to sexual body parts when body 
parts are masked, then perceivers have more time to focus on 
the spatial information about the parts as well as the faces. 
Consistently, Loughnan et al. (2010) showed higher mental 
state attribution (e.g., emotions, intentions) when pictures 
of  women’s faces (vs. their body or body-only) were evalu-
ated. In a similar vein, personhood-focus (vs. appearance- fo-
cus) leads to more focus on women’s faces and less on their 
bodies (Gervais et al., 2013). Moreover, recent research has 
shown that the body-inversion effect was not found for head-
less bodies (Minnebusch, Suchan, & Daum, 2009) and that 
head position is crucial for a body-inversion effect to emerge 
(Yovel et al., 2010). Relying on eye-tracking devices may be 
a fruitful approach to further delineate the specific atten-
tional mechanisms that are shifted when the salience of  sex-
ual body parts is tempered.
Future research may examine the role of  emotional states 
(activated by descriptions provided prior to the recognition 
task) that may be informative because positive emotions can 
lead to configural, rather than analytic, processing (Johnson 
& Fredrickson, 2005). Indeed, we provided information with 
a positive valence for the humanization manipulation in Ex-
periment 3. Future research should investigate whether pre-
senting neutral (Harris & Fiske, 2007) or negative human-
izing information may also shift body recognition. Future 
work may also manipulate the type of  information provided 
prior to the recognition task (warmth, competence, or a com-
bination of  the two), which would extend the current work 
by disentangling the effect of  warmth (vs. competence). For 
example, is it possible that increasing warmth attributions 
without concomitant competence attributions would cause 
benevolent sexism or patronization of  women, leading to 
more objectification, despite the presence of  more human-
izing information (Calogero & Jost, 2011). Activating such 
communal norms may prompt stereotypes that ‘‘women 
should be nurtured and protected’’ and contribute to wom-
en’s subjugation (Mahalik et al., 2005). However, it is also 
possible that negatively valenced information about warmth 
or competence, such as information that women are cold or 
incompetent, would increase objectification through a dehu-
manization mechanism (Heflick & Goldenberg, 2009). Such 
designs would extend the literature by further disentangling 
the effects of  individuation, valence, and dehumanization.
Finally, in the current research, we did not measure the 
extent to which people perceived sexualized women as 
warmer and more competent in the humanization (vs. neu-
tral) condition, although future research would benefit from 
including such manipulation checks. However, our set of  
studies offers a first step in this direction by showing that 
providing some individuating information about women’s 
internal competence and warmth states (which are funda-
mental to human perception; Fiske et al., 2002) tempers an-
alytic processing of  their bodies.
It is plausible that cognitive objectification may also pre-
dict mind perception and attitudes toward specific targets. 
Future research may examine the links between body recog-
nition and other outcomes of  objectification such as dehu-
manization (Haslam, 2006) and instrumentality (Gruenfeld, 
Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008). This intriguing possibility 
requires further consideration, given that person perception 
takes place prior to person categorization and impression for-
mation (Quadflieg & Macrae, 2011). It is possible that peo-
ple who rely on analytic processing when perceiving a person 
would categorize the person as object-like. In turn, this cate-
gorization may activate attitudes consistent with such cate-
gorization (e.g., men who categorized women as animals en-
dorsed more negative attitudes toward women such as rape 
proclivity; Rudman & Mescher, 2012). An alternative pos-
sibility is that social categorization processes impact person 
recognition (Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009).
Consistent with previous research (Bernard et al., 2012; 
Gervais, Vescio, Maass, et al., 2012), participants’ gender 
did not moderate recognition performance observed in the 
present experiments, thereby suggesting that these findings 
do not reflect in-group bias. Applied to the recognition of  
female bodies, there is another plausible explanation con-
sistent with objectification theory. Fredrickson and Roberts 
(1997) posit that people internalize women’s appearance as 
a primary basis for self-worth. Consequently, it is plausi-
ble that women are categorized differently than men such 
that women tend to be evaluated primarily based on their 
appearance (including by women themselves) and men are 
evaluated based on their personality and competence (Fred-
rickson & Roberts, 1997). This difference in terms of  social 
categorization may modify recognition processes, mobilizing 
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analytic processing instead of  configural processing. How-
ever, examining connections between processing and other 
steps of  social perception is a new and interesting perspec-
tive that may be informative for sexual objectification re-
search and, more generally, for research on both dehuman-
ization and discrimination.
Practice Implications
At a practical level, findings of  Experiment 2a and 2b are 
consistent with the notion that pictures highlighting female 
sexual body parts or depicting them as sexualized bodies 
are the most dehumanizing ones (Loughnan et al., 2010). 
To be clear, the sole responsibility of  objectification lies in 
perceivers who perpetuate objectification and the sociocul-
tural context that encourages it. Yet, our results suggest that 
contextual factors aimed to diminish the salience of  wom-
en’s sexual body parts may inform interventions to reduce 
objectification. In the media, film, television, and advertise-
ments, pixelation may constitute an unusual technique and 
may be perceived as distracting. However, other techniques 
aimed at reducing the salience of  sexual body parts, such as 
framing techniques that place a greater emphasis on non-sex-
ual body parts of  women, may prove efficient to counteract 
objectification (cf. Archer, Iritani, Kimes, & Barrios, 1983; 
Matthews, 2007). Likewise, our data suggest that eliminat-
ing the use of  sexualized images of  women and promoting 
the use of  individuating and humanizing information about 
women in media depictions would reduce the analytic pro-
cessing of  women’s bodies. 
Moreover, Experiment 3’s results suggest that sexy 
women are not doomed to be perceived as objects. Interven-
tions that train perceivers not to focus on women’s body parts 
but rather to actively seek individuating and humanizing in-
formation about their internal states (e.g., their thoughts, 
feelings, goals, and desires) could serve to counteract the cog-
nitive objectification of  women. For example, perspective-
taking manipulations derived from research on intergroup 
relations (Batson & Ahmad, 2009) may be one avenue to 
encourage perceivers to seek out individuating information.
Conclusion
Our article corroborates the idea that analytic processing 
of  women’s bodies is one indicator of  sexual objectification 
at a basic cognitive level. Sexual objectification can be con-
sidered an analytic appraisal isolating body parts relevant to 
a perceiver’s goals, which in turn lead the perceiver to fail 
to consider the target configurally. This is also true for other 
forms of  objectification that have been identified (Gervais, 
Bernard et al., 2013). Instrumentality, for example, isolates 
the function from the person (Gruenfeld et al., 2008; Kant, 
1797), appearance-focus isolates superficial aspects of  the 
person from personality (Heflick & Goldenberg, 2009; Lang-
ton, 2009), and sexual objectification isolates sexual body 
parts from the entire body (Bartky, 1990; Gervais, Vescio, 
Maass, et al., 2012; Langton, 2009). By demonstrating how 
contextual factors related to objectification temper analytic 
processing of  sexualized female bodies, we simultaneously 
highlighted the construct validity of  the body-inversion ef-
fect and analytic processing as useful indicators of  objectifi-
cation at a basic cognitive level. Our research also provides 
the foundations for potential interventions to reduce the ob-
ject-like recognition of  sexualized female bodies.
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